1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 SEAN MONTGOMERY. Civil No. 13-2045 BTM (MDD) 12 Petitioner. ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. BILL GORE, Warden 14 Respondent. 15 Petitioner, a detainee at San Diego County Jail, proceeding pro se, has filed a 16 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.¹ 17 FAILURE TO SATISFY THE FILING FEE REQUIREMENT 18 but has failed to pay the \$5.00 filing fee and has failed to move to proceed in forma 19 pauperis. Because this Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the \$5.00 20 filing fee or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court **DISMISSES** the case 21 without prejudice. See Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. If Petitioner wishes to proceed 22 with this case, he must submit, no later than November 4, 2013, a copy of this Order 23 with the \$5.00 fee or with adequate proof of his inability to pay the fee. The Clerk of 24 Court shall send a blank Southern District of California In Forma Pauperis Application 25 to Petitioner along with a copy of this Order. 26 27 28

¹ The Petition was originally filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals transferred the Petition to this Court on August 29, 2013. (*See* ECF No. 3.)

FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); *Granberry v. Greer*, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); *Granberry*, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in *Duncan v. Henry*, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: "If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." *Id.* at 365-66 (emphasis added). For example, "[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court." *Id.* at 366 (emphasis added).

Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner is currently detained at San Diego County Jail. In his Petition he references numerous case numbers. He claims his defense counsel is ineffective and that his right to a speedy trial has been denied. (*See* Pet. at 5-9.) It is not clear that Petitioner has yet suffered convictions for any of the cases referenced,² or if he is still awaiting trial on all charges.³ It is clear, however, that Petitioner has not alleged

While not entirely clear, there is some indication that Petitioner has been convicted of some charges, but not yet sentenced at the time the petition was filed. (*See* Pet. at 4.)

³ Federal courts generally abstain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings before the entry of a judgment of conviction. Fundamental principles of "comity and federalism" prohibit federal courts from intervening in ongoing state actions. *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Under *Younger*, federal courts may not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. *Id.* at 45-46; *see Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n*, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (stating that *Younger* "espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.") These concerns are particularly

to have raised his claims in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme Court he must so specify. "The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner." *Matthews v. Evatt*, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); *see Breard v. Pruett*, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998); *Lambert v. Blackwell*, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); *Oyler v. Allenbrand*, 23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); *Rust v. Zent*, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994).

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:

- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
- (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
- (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006).

The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed <u>state</u> habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); *see Nino v. Galaza*, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). *But see Artuz v. Bennett*, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that "an application is 'properly filed' when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings."). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of

important in the habeas context where a state prisoner's conviction may be reversed on appeal, thereby rendering the federal issue moot. *Sherwood v. Tompkins*, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983).

limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal of a habeas petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . " Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court remedies. **CONCLUSION** For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is **DISMISSED** without prejudice for failure to satisfy the filing fee and failure to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. If Petitioner wishes to have this case reopened, he must, no later than November 4, , (1) pay the filing fee or provide adequate proof of his inability to pay **and** (2) file a First Amended Petition which cures the pleading deficiencies discussed above. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: September 25, 2013 WITZ, Chief Judge Inited States District Court